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Defendants-Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
The Rules of Appellate Procedure prohibit the injection
of new issues in the Reply Brief of the Appellant, and limit
discussion in the Reply Brief tb issues raised and discussed in
Appelleefs Brief. The issues raised in Appellee's Brief and which
will be discussed in this Reply Brief are as follows:
1.

General attempts by Appellee to urge unduly narrow

interpretations of the law upon this Court.
2.

Whether

or

not

the

"deliberate

indifference"

standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the City of
Canton case applies to the present case.
3.

Whether or not there is a legitimate right of

privacy protected by the Constitution which extends to sexual
molestation committed under color of law.

1

4.

Whether or not the standard of Respondeat Superior

discussed by the Utah Supreme Court in Birkner v. Salt Lake County
is applicable to the facts of this case.
5.

Whether or not West Valley was negligent in that it

could or should have foreseen the conduct of its employee and/or
had a duty to test its police employees before hiring them for
police service.
POINT I
APPELLANT URGES UNREASONABLY NARROW INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE LAW UPON THIS COURT
A.

West Valley's Constructive Knowledge Includes Knowledge of
Misconduct in Other Police Departments.
Appellant argues that there was no prior history in West

Valley City of hiring police officers who were sexually deviant.
Appellant states: "Indeed, West Valley was in its inception at the
time it hired Lyday."

(Brief of Appellant at page 29.) This being

the case, West Valley alleges that there has been no proof of a
policy, procedure or custom of acquiescence in a known pattern of
unconstitutional behavior, and that Section 1983 liability can
therefore not attach.
West Valley would have this Court conclude that each
individual police department throughout the entire country should
be considered in a cocoon, like an ostrich with its head in the
sand, devoid of knowledge of the activities and problems of any
other police department.
any other entity.

In reality, police departments are like

They are required to be observant and keep

themselves informed of trends and problems in law enforcement
2

nationwide.

Thus, West Valley

cannot defend

its

inadequate

policies in hiring on the basis that it allegedly had no prior
experience with sexually deviant police officers.

West Valley's

actual constructive knowledge must be extended to include the
experience of other police departments throughout the country. On
that basis, there is a very well known history of officers taking
advantage of their positions of authority to sexually molest and
abuse innocent victims.
B.

West Valley Did Not Require Actual
Sexually Deviant.

Knowledge

Lyday was

Another example of the unreasonable extremes which West
Valley urges upon this Court is found on page 30-31 of Appellee's
Brief,

wherein

it

is

stated:

"Without

West

Valley's

actual

knowledge of Lyday's prior deviant, sexual misconduct, if any, or
some other notice of this employee's propensity

(assuming such

existed at the time) , the need to screen for sexual deviancy could
not have been 'so obvious1 and the inadequacy 'so likely' to result
in the violation of J.H.'s constitutional rights that West Valley
could reasonably be said to have been 'deliberately indifferent',
to the need".
In other words, West Valley argues that there is no need
to test an officer for sexual deviancy unless the city has actual
knowledge the officer is sexually deviant.
be a need for testing is not explained.

Why there would then

If this standard were to

be adopted by the Court, it would be akin to the Court requiring
Plaintiff to prove that the city had a deliberate intent to hire
sexual deviants. This is of course an improper standard, one which
3

neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor any other Appellate Court has
required to be demonstrated before Section 1983 liability may be
found.

POINT II
THE CITY OF CANTON STANDARD OF
"DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE" APPLIES IN THIS CASE.
West Valley's Brief repeatedly questions whether or not
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in City of Canton, Ohio v.
Harris, 49 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989) has application in the
present case.

West Valley contends that the Canton case involved

issues regarding the "training" of police officers, rather than
issues of "hiring" and "supervision".

In reality, a careful and

thoughtful reading of the decision of the Supreme Court in Canton
reveals that "training" was not the issue, but rather, deficient
policies in general, whether they be training, screening before
hiring, supervising, etc. Quoting again from the pertinent holding
in Canton, the Supreme Court stated as follows:
We hold today that the inadequacy of police
training may serve as the basis for Section
1983 liability only where the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the
rights of persons with whom the police come
into contact. This rule is most consistent
with our admonition in Monell . . . that a
municipality can be liable under section 1983
only where its policies are the "moving force
[behind] the constitutional violation." Only
where a municipality's failure to train its
employees in a relevant respect evidences a
"deliberate indifference" to the rights of its
inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly
thought of as a city "policy or custom" that
is actionable under Section 1983.
4

"Municipal
liability under Section 1983
attaches where - and only where - a deliberate
choice to follow a course of action is made
from among various alternatives" by city policy
makers. . . . only where a failure to train
reflects a "deliberate" or "conscious" choice
by a municipality - a policy as defined by our
prior cases - can a city be liable for such a
failure under Section 1983.
. the issue in a case like this one,
however, is whether that training program is
adequate; and if it is not, the question
becomes whether such inadequate training can
justifiably said to represent "city policy."
It may seem contrary to common sense to assert
that a municipality will actually have a policy
of not taking reasonable steps to train its
employees. But it may happen that in light of
the duties assigned to specific officers or
employees the need for more or different
training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so
likely to result in the violation of
constitutional rights, that the policy makers
of the city can reasonably be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to the need. In that
event, the failure to provide proper training
may fairly be said to represent a policy for
which the city is responsible, and for which
the city may be held liable if it actually
causes injury. (£d. at 1204-1205, emphasis
added•)
In its holding, the Court used the term "policy" or some
form thereof no less than eight times.

It is clear therefore that

the Court did not intend to limit the "deliberate indifference"
standard to only those narrow situations where training of police
officers is involved, but rather intended that the standard would
extend to any "policy" of the city which leads to unconstitutional
acts by its police officers.
Common sense dictates that those same concerns which
motivate city policy makers in regards to the training of its
police officers, should also motivate those policy makers in
5

regards to hiring and supervision of those same police officers.
Proper

practices

in hiring,

training

and

supervising

police

officers all work together to insure that the officers fulfill
their

duties

appropriately,

and

constitutional rights of citizens.
an entire program.

without

intrusion

on

the

They are inseparable parts of

Therefore, if West Valley can be said to have

been "deliberately indifferent" to the interests and concerns of
its citizens when it failed to properly screen and supervise
Officer Lyday, and such deliberate indifference resulted in an
unconstitutional deprivation, the city should be liable.

POINT III
WEST VALLEY IGNORES PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM TO A VIOLATION
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
West
constitutional

Valley
right

acknowledges
of

privacy,

the

although

existence
claiming

of

a

that

no

constitutional right of privacy of the "specific nature" alleged
has ever been found.

There is virtually no response or discussion

regarding the many citations of authority in Appellantfs Brief
discussing the right of privacy which has been found to exist by
both Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court.
Rather than seriously discuss the privacy issue raised
in Plaintiff's Complaint and Appeal Brief, West Valley discusses
in some detail the 14th Amendment and cases arising therefrom which
conclude that there is no violation of liberty without due process
of law if a post-deprivation remedy is provided.
6

This is the same

tactic used by West Valley in its Motion for Summary Judgment, and
which the District Court approved.

However, Plaintiff has not

relied upon the 14th Amendment, and citation to case law arising
therefrom is totally irrelevant and inappropriate.

West Valley

must not be allowed to divert the Court's attention to focus on the
14th Amendment, when Plaintiff's claimed constitutional deprivation
was based on the well accepted right of privacy found in the
constitution.
Even when briefly discussing the privacy claims raised
by Plaintiff, West Valley attempts to phrase the issues in terms
of common assault. They allege that if Plaintiff's claim is upheld
"any assault" that causes personal injury to ones body or mind
could be characterized as a "privacy" violation.

This is not

correct. It is clear that a sexual intrusion of the nature alleged
by Plaintiff is different from assault.

It is also

clear that

sexual molestation calls into issue matters of "privacy" which
assault does not.

Indeed, body parts necessarily involved in

sexual molestation are commonly referred to as "private parts".
(Websters

New

World

Dictionary,

2nd

College

Edition,

1986,

definition of "private".) There is thus a very distinct difference
between one who assaults another by punching him in the nose, and
one who fondles the "private parts" of an unwilling victim.
West

Valley's

assertion

that

there

has

never

been

recognized a constitutionally protected privacy right involving
sexual offenses by police officers is also incorrect.

In York v.

Storv, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963), Cert. Den. 376 U.S. 939,
7

11 L.Ed. 2d 659, 84 S. Ct. 794, a female plaintiff came to a police
station to complain of an assault.

The officer with whom she

consulted insisted that the complainant be photographed in various
nude and indecent positions.
maintained

that

photographs.

her

bruises

She objected to undressing and
would

not

show

on

The officer nevertheless proceeded

any

of

the

to take the

pictures without calling a policewoman who was present at the
station.

The officer thereafter printed and circulated those

pictures among police personnel.

It was held by the 9th Circuit

that the police officer's actions constituted such an arbitrary
intrusion upon the Plaintiff's privacy as to make him liable in an
action under the Federal Civil Rights Act.

Also, in Martin v.

Covington, 541 F. Supp. 803 (E.D.Ky. 1982), a police department was
held liable under the Federal Civil Rights Act for violation of a
privacy right when it forced the Plaintiff to solicit homosexual
acts, although such acts were never actually engaged in.

POINT IV
THE STANDARD FOR RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR CLAIMS
ESTABLISHED IN BIRKNER V. SALT LAKE COUNTY IS INAPPROPRIATE
IN THE PARTICULAR FACTS OF THIS CASE
A.

Plaintiff Believed that Lyday's Acts Were Authorized and
Furthered the Interests of the Employer.
West Valley claims that Plaintiff's Respondeat Superior

claim must be denied.

West Valley relies on the case of Birkner

v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989), wherein the Court
held that Salt Lake County was not liable under the doctrine of
8

Respondeat Superior for the actions of a social worker employed by
the County. The social worker had engaged in sexual relations with
a client, for which the client later sued.

The Court held that

Salt Lake County could not be held liable for the actions of its
employee, citing as its main reason the fact that both the social
worker and the client knew that the sexual contact was not related
to the legitimate interests of the employer.
"Neither Flowers

The Court stated:

(the social worker) nor Birkner

(the client)

thought their sexual conduct was part of the therapy - - the
service that Flowers was hired to provide." (Id. at 1058, Emphasis
added.)
The present case is very different. J.H. did believe the
physical contacts initiated by Lyday were related to the interests
of

the

employer.

Lyday

specifically

informed

J.H.

before

initiating the contact that he (Lyday) was going to teach J.H.
"standard relaxation techniques" used by police officers. J.H. had
joined the Explorer Post because he was interested in police work
as a career, and because he knew that the Post had been established
to

train

and

guide young people

enforcement careers.
Para. 14.]

interested

in pursuing

law

(R. at 184 [Affidavit of David C. Campbell,

R. at 210 [Affidavit of Jason Hepler, Para. 3-9.])

Plaintiff therefore submitted to the physical contact initiated by
Lyday in the reasonable belief that Lyday was furthering the
interests

of

his

employer.

This

case

is

therefore

very

distinguishable from Birkner.
B.

An Employer Should be Liable When the Employee's Wrongful Acts
are Apparently Authorized.
9

Accepting for the purposes of tliis argument that Lyday
knew that his actions were not calculated fc« -further the interests
of his employer, it is nevertheless appropriate that the doctrine
of Respondeat Superior apply when the master creates a situation
whereby an employee is able to deliberately injure an unsuspecting
victim.

If the master creates circumstances leading the victim to

believe that the acts of the employee are appropriate, the master
should be liable for the employee's acts.

These principles are

very clearly endorsed in the Restatement of Agency, 2d, Sections
261-266.

Most clearly on point in this ca$e are Sections 266 and

262 which provide as follows:
Section 266. Physical Harm Caused by Reliance
Upon Representations.
A purported master or other principle is
subject to liability for physical harm caused
to others . . . by their reasonable reliance
upon the tortious representations of one acting
within his apparent authority or apparent scope
of employment.
Section 262. Agent Acts for His Own Purposes.
A person who otherwise would be liable to
another for the misrepresentations of one
apparently acting for him is not released from
liability by the fact that the servant or other
agent acts entirely for his own purposes,
unless the other has notice of this.
The above rules serve not only to protect innocent
victims such as Plaintiff in this case, but also, in the final
analysis, are beneficial to the employer.

It is in the interest

of employers that the statements and representations of their
employees be respected and relied upon by customers and others who
deal with the employee. The employer would not be served by a rule
10

of law which encourages customers to be questioning and suspicious
of every statement and representation of the company's employees.
This

factor

departments.

is

especially

important

in

regard

to

police

A police department would be greatly hampered in

fulfilling its duties if citizens questioned and challenged every
order and direction of the cityfs police officers.

Citizens will

be encouraged to abide by the directions of police officers if they
have

assurance

those

directions

are

backed

by

the

police

department, even if it is later determined that the officer was
acting for his own purposes.
C.

Higher Respondeat Superior Standards Should Apply to-Police
Departments.
There is, of course, one other distinguishing feature

between Birkner and the present case. The employee in the present
case was a police officer, whereas the employee in the Birkner case
was a social worker. There are certainly major differences between
police

officers

and

social

workers.

Police

officers

are

unquestionably the most conspicuous, respected, and authoritative
employees of a municipality.

Police officers wear distinctive

uniforms and drive conspicuous automobiles.

They are given guns

and other badges of authority. They have the authority to stop any
person at any time for any reason, or for no reason at all.

A

person thus detained may very reasonably believe that the officer
is serving the needs of the master.

Given such unique authorities

and powers granted police officers, this Court should impose a
strict Respondeat Superior standard upon the city for the actions
of its police officers. The standards which should apply are those
11

enunciated in the cases of White v. County of Orange. 166 Cal. App.
3rd 566, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1985); Applewhite v. City of Baton
Rouge, 380 So, 119 (La. App. 1979); and Turner v. State. 494 So.
2d 1292 (La. App. 1986), which were cited in Appellant's Brief.

POINT V
NEGLIGENCE ISSUES
West Valley asserts three reasons as to why it cannot be
found liable under a negligence theory:
(1)

There is allegedly no evidence that West Valley

could or should have known of Lyday's sexual deviancies;
(2)

There is no duty to test police employees for

sexual deviancy; and,
(3)

The

actions

of

Lyday

were

completely

unforeseeable.

A.

Evidence that West Valley Could Have Known of Lyday's Sexual
Deviancies.
West Valley omits certain important facts contained in

the record when it states that there is no evidence that it could
have known about Lydayfs sexual deviancy.

The Affidavit of Arthur

Brown stated very clearly that testing was available and could have
been employed by West Valley at the time Lyday was hired, and that
had such testing been employed it would more than likely have
detected the sexually deviant attitudes and character of Lyday,
thus enabling West Valley to avoid the mistake of hiring Lyday.
[R. at 217-219]

Indeed, this testing could have been carried out
12

at any time during Lydayfs employment, and would certainly have
been appropriate again at the time when the city first contemplated
placing Lyday in a delicate position of trust and authority over
vulnerable young people.
B.

The Duty to Conduct Psychological Testing
There clearly is a duty on the part of police departments

in the State of Utah to conduct psychological testing of police
employees, or at least to insure that such psychological testing
has been performed by some other agency, before the department
hires a police officer.
Utah Code Ann* Section 67-16-6 (1)(h) provides that an
applicant for a police department: "Shall be free of any physical,
emotional, or mental condition that might affect adversely the
performance of duty as a peach officer,

as determined through a

selection process by the employing agency."

(Emphasis added.) The

"selection process" envisioned by this section clearly requires
something more than and different from the "background check" West
Valley claims to have conducted on Lyday before he was hired.

The

background check conducted by West Valley is discussed in Section
67-16-6(1) (g) which provides that the applicant "shall demonstrate
good moral character, as determined by a background investigation."
(Emphasis added.) Acknowledging for the purposes of this argument
that a background check was indeed conducted by West Valley, the
question

remains

as to what

"selection

process" West Valley

employed to insure that Lyday was "free of any . . . emotional or
mental conditions that might affect adversely the performance of
13

duty as a peace officer . . ." West Valley was under a statutory
obligation to conduct psychological testing, and failed to fulfill
that duty.
C.

The Actions of West Valley's Employee Were Foreseeable
West

Valley

contends

that

Lyday's

actions

were

not

foreseeable, and only with the benefit of hindsight is it apparent
that it might have been wise to be more careful in hiring and
supervising

Lyday.

In

fact, Lyday's

actions were

not only

foreseeable, but were almost inevitable given the totally deficient
practices of West Valley.
Sexual

offenses

police

against

officers

unsuspecting

occur

regularly

and

innocent

citizens

by

throughout

this

country.

Indeed, the headlines of local newspapers have recently

been filled on several occasions with escapades of local law
enforcement
others.

officials who have

sexually molested

or harassed

West Valley cannot therefore be heard to say that such

problems are unforeseeable. Despite knowledge of such abuses, West
Valley hired Lyday without any attempt to certify his psychological
fitness. This negligence was then compounded when Lyday was placed
in a sensitive position of trust and authority over young people.
Again, no attempt was made to certify his
position.

fitness for such

West Valley's irresponsibility continued as Lyday was

allowed to function in this position without training, and with
absolutely

no

supervision.

To

grant

anyone

such

unbridled

authority over young people is totally unacceptable.

Under such

circumstances,

case

abuses

such

as
14

occur*-^

-in

+-his

were

inevitable, if not from Lyday, then firom some future similarly
situated employee.
CONCLUSION
Substantial

factual issues remain to be resolved in

regard to each cause of action enumerated in Plaintiff's complaint
against

West

Department.

Valley

City

and

the

West

Valley

City

Police

The District Court Summary Judgment should therefore

be reversed, and further proceedings conducted to resolve all
issues of fact.
DATED this

Z2L

day of

Or ^)l^r

1990.

ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN &
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Richard I. Ashton
Wayne H. Braunberger
David A. Wilde
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